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THE INTERNATIONAL
IMPLICATIONS OF TAX REFORM
by Reuven S. Avi-Yon!!h

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is assistant professor of
law, Harvard Law School. The purpose of this
article is to initiate a discussion of the likely international implications were the United States to
adopt one of three tax reform proposals currently
under consideration: the Archer-Lugar proposal
for a national sales tax, the Armey-Shelby proposal for a flat tax, and the Nunn-Domenici proposal for a graduated consumption tax. The article suggests that the adoption of any of those
proposals is likely to have a profoundly destabilizing effect on the international tax regime,
and may lead to unrestricted tax competition,
which could have adverse effects on the rest of
the world as well as on the United States.
The author would like to thank the participants in the conference on the USA tax proposal held at Harvard on July 14, 1995, for their
extremely useful comments on an earlier version
of this article. Special thanks are due to Bill
Andrews, David Bradford, Michael Graetz, Louis
Kaplow, Peggy Musgrave, Adrian Ogley, Oliver
Oldman, Al Warren, and Bernie Wolfman for their
help and encouragement. The author is particularly grateful to Ste, e Shay for letting him cite
Shay's unput- 1;shed memorandum t'l the ABA
Tax Section . ,1alyzing the international implications of the 1,at tax and USA proposals.
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TAX NOTES, November 13, 1995

The current proposals to substitute consumption for
income as the principal U.S. tax base have already been
the topic of considerable commentary in these pages .1
However, one issue has received relatively little attention in the discussion of the various reform proposals:
What potential complications are likely to arise 1f a
single major player in the world 's economy unilate r.11ly adopts radical tax reform? 2 The global economy is
becoming more and more unified, with multinational
corporations dominating world trade and trillions of
dollars in portfolio investment flowing across national
boundaries. In this economy, what would be the consequences if a single country, especially one as important as the United States, wc rt: to radically deviate from
the tax policies adopted t>y its trading partners? 3

'Se,·. t .g .. A. Warre1o, '"The Proposal for an 'Unlimited
Savings Allowance,"' Tax Noles, Aug. 28, 1995, p. 1103; L.
Kaph>w, #Recovery or Pre-Enactment Basis Under a Consumption Tax: The USA Tax System," Ta:r Noles, Aug. 28, 1995,
p. 1109; A. Feld, •Nunn-Domenici and Nonprofits, Tox Nolts ,
Aug. 28, 1995, p. 1119; B. Wolrman, #Corporate Tax Issues
Under the Nunn-Domenici Consumption Tax,# Tax Notes,
Aug. 28, 1995, p. 1121 ; B. Bartlett, •Replacing Federal Taxes
with a Sales Tax." Tax Notes, Aug. 21, 1995, p. 997; P. Merrill,
S. Ken Shah, and K. Wertz, #Corporate Ta• Liability Under
the USA and Flat Taxes," Tox Notes, Aug. 7, 1995, p. 741 ; R.
Bernstein, A. Fogarasi and R. Gordon, #Tax Reform 1995:
Looking at Two Options," Tox Notr-,; , July 17, 1995, p. 327.
' There is some discussion or specific international ta•
issues in C. Mclure and G. Zodrow, HA Hyl,rid Approach to
the Direct Taxation or Consumption." in fro,r/itrs of To:r
Reform (paper presented at the Hoover Institution conference,
May 11, 1995) (hereinarter Mclure and Zodrow). and an excellent analysis or the salient international issues presented
by the flat tax and USA proposals in S. Shay, M('Prlorandum lo
H

ABA Ta:r Srclion Ta:r Systems Tosk Foret on Sdrcted International
Tax lssuts Roiud l1y the Domenici-Nunn USA Tax Act of 1995
(5 . 722) and the Anney-She/1,y Frudom and Fairness Restoration
Act (H.R . 2060. S. 1050) (October 4, 1995) (hereinafter Shay).

'Currently, the U.S. relies Jess on consumption and more
on income taxation than any other member or the OECD.
Thus, a certain shirt toward consumption as the principal ta1t
base would be in lin.: with the policies adopted elsewhere.
However, no OECD member seems likely to favor abandoning income tnalion altogether and substituting a form of
consumption-based ta•ation. Such a move seems less likely
in other OECD countries (and in most other countries)
precisely because they already have a VAT.
913
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The purpose of this article is to initiate a discussion of
this question by examining some of the inlemational implications of three current proposals for radinl tax
reform.• These are, in increasing order of complexity, lhe
Archer-Lugar proposal to abolish lhe income tax and repl.k'e it with• national sales tax; lhe Armey-Shel,y proposal
for a Hat tax; and the NUM-Domenici propmal for a
progressive consumption tax.5 The rationale for these pr&
posals has been examined extensively ellewhere." In a
nutshell, it is as follows: The United States savings rate is
too low compared with that of our trading partners; part
of the reason for this situation is lhe discriminatory heat•
meot of savings, compam:i with current a>nsumption.
under an income tax; therefore, the tax system should be
reformed to tax consumption, but not savings. In addition,
all three proposals aim to offer significant simplification
in comparison with lhe CUffl!l'lt income tax.

Archer-Lugar: A National Sain Tax
The Archer-Lugar proposal is by far the simplest. as

well as the most straightforward, of the three proposals
mentioned above.7 Rep. Bill Archer, R-Texas, and Sen.
Richard G. Lugar, R-lnd., would abolish both the corporate and individual income taxes, and replace them with
a national sales tax (in addition to the sales taxes levied
by most of the states). Since the sales tax would by definition apply only to consumption, any savings would be
exempt from tax until consumed. It is useful to examine
this proposal first, because its simplicity makes it possi,le
to clarify the potential international consequences
without the obfuscation introduced by the complexity of
the other proposals. As wiU be seen, however, much of
what is said about the Ardler-Lugar proposal applies to
the more complex reform proposals as well.
To assess the international implications of the ArcherLugar proposal, it is necessary first to briefly summarize the main features of the cun-ent international
tax regime.• There are two major types of juritdiction
to tax: jurisdiction based on the residence of the taxpayer, and jurisdiction based on the source of the in• Proposals to eliminate the income tu ue •radaJ• in the
that they abandon the entire structure built over the pnt
80 yun of experience with the income tax, and start anew. It
termS quite fusible to envisage various refonns that achieve
a certain shift towards consumption-baled taxation. u well
• lignificant simplification. without completely abandoning
income baed taxation.
' For the Anney-Shelby flat tax proposal, see the •Freedom
.ind F.iimess Restor.alion Act of 1995• (H.R. 2060, S. 1050),
introduced by House Majority Leader Richard Armey and
Sen. Richilrd Shelby on July 19, 1995 (herein.after H.R. 2060);
for the Nunn-Domenici USA tax proposal, see S. 722, introduced by Senaton Nunn, Doaenici, and Keney on April 25,
1995 (hereinafter S. 722), and the detailed explanation found
in •uSA Tu Systelll: Delmption and Explanation of the
Unlimited Savinp Allowantt Income Tax System,• Tu Noln,
lffl9e

Mar. 10, 1995, p. 1482 (Special Supplement) (herein.after
Dncription).

..,,..

'S«, , ., .• the articles cited in no1e 1 ..,,•.
'For an examination of this propoul. aee llartlett, note 1

'This suaunarv is baled on R. Avi-Yonah. "The Structure
ol lnlemlllional Taxation: A PropoNI for Simplifecation,• Ttm Ln, Rn. - (forthcoming. April 1996).
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come. The first type typically applies to foreign-source
income of all residents of the taxing jurisdiction,
whereas the second applies to income derived from the
taxing jurisdiction by nonresidents. In general, the
trend in international taxation has been to tax portfolio
income and wages, most of which is earned by indi \tidual taxpayers, on a residence basis, while active
business income, much of which is earned by corporations, is taxed primarily on a source basis. In both cases,
however, there is residual taxation on • source basis of
portfolio income (as indicated by the retention of low
withholding taxes in tax treaties), and residual
residence-baled taxation of business income (as indicated by subpart F and similar provisions aimed at
taxing business income derived from tax havens on a
residence basis).
The Archer-Lugar proposal, if enacted, would tend
to undermine both of these types of jurisdiction to tax
by turning the United Stales into an immense tax haven
for avoiding income taxes. Let us consider first the
implications for inbound portfolio investment. The
ability of foreign countries to implement effective
residence-based taxation of their residents has always
been limited by the existence of tax havens, but the
current array of tax havens do not offer the same investment opportunities as a major industrialiud economy, and some progress has been made in curbing the
use of tax havens through information exchange pr&
grUtS. The United States has traditionally led the fight
against tax havens through its insistence on stringent
limitation on benefits articles in its tax treaties, and on
expanding information exchange programs.

I

The Art:IHlr-L~r propoul would tum
,,,. Un/lWI SIii• into •n ,,,,,,,.,,.. tu
NINII for •WIiding lnt:OIIIII t•x•.

All this would change, however, were the U.S. to
abolish income taxation. Ever since the U.S. unilaterally abolished withholding on portfolio interest investments by foreigners in 1984, much of the world's capital flight has found itself channeled to the U.S. The
result has been an acute lack of capital in many
developing countries, whose elites found it much safer
to invest tax-free in the U.S., than to invest in taxable
(or even tax-free, but riskier) pro;ects back home. This
phenomenon will likely be amplified many times over
if the income tax is entirely abolished. Since the U.S.
will not tax funds spent on consumption outside its
boundaries, while consumption goes effectively untaxed in many other jurisdictions, much of the world's
mobi~ital may be invested tax-free in the U.S., but
consu
outside its borders. In the end, the U.S. may
be effectively forcing developing countries to abandon
residence-based income taxation altogether, which
may or may not be consistent with their long-term
interests and policy preferences.• Developing countries
'For a view advoc.iting this result as advantageous to
developing countrilS (on a COMenSUIII, not fofted, basis), see C .
Zodrow and C. Mclure, •tmplementinK Diftd Cmsumplion
Taxes in Drveloping Countries; 46 llt.r Lia, ""1. 4'15 (1991).
TAX NOTES, Nowntber 13. 1115
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may then fall back on the only available source of
revenue, and raise their source-based withholding
talles on inbound investment - an outcome that would
not be favorable to either the developing countries
themselves (who would be enacting a wedge against
foreign investment) or to the U.S as a major source of
that investment.
The likely outcome for both outbound and inbound
direct investment would be different, because much of
that investment flows to developed countries that have
the ability to car"ue the residual business taxes
foregone by the U.S. if it abandons source-based income taxation of direct investment. For U.S. corporations, who currently benefit from deferral of the
foreign-source active income of their subsidiaries (and
therefore seek to increase such foreign-sourtt earnings), the main goal would be to shift as much of their
worldwide profit as possible to the U.S., as the new tax
haven. This can be achieved, e.g., by transfer pricing
manipulation (i.e., by inflating the cost of boods sold
by U.S. entities to related parties abroad), and by
repatriating as much earnings as possible from foreign
subsidiaries as deductible interest or royalty payments.
While this development can have a positive initial effect on the U.S. balance of payments, other countries
are likely to attempt to block such practices by transfer
pricing enforcement, thin capitalization rules, and controls over repatriation of funds. In addition, in the
absence of a treaty network (about which see below),
our trading partners are likely to sharply raise their
withholding rates on repatriation of funds into the
United States, and to attempt to expand their taxing
;urisdiction by shifting the source of income from the
U.S. The end result is likely to be a distortion of capital
flows, with increasing investment by U.S.-based multinationals in the U.S., even if (but for taxes) other areas
of the world are more promising. The deadweight loss
to the world economy is unlikely to benefit the US., as
one of its major participants.
As far as inbound foreign direct investment is concerned, the likely outcome from abolishing the income
tax will be a repetition of the scenario for outbound
direct investment, but in the reverse: Foreign-based
multinationals will seek to expand their investments
in the U.S., possibly by buying US. corporations and
shifting taxable profits to them in the ume ways outlined above. This could again involve the U.S. in disputes with its trading partners, who will seek to
prevent the erosion of their income tax bases by curtailing investment in the U.S. A return to a world
dominated by restrictions on direct investment is quite
possible, with all its negative implications for the effi•
cient allocation of global investment.
In addition, foreign countries may try to capture the
U.S. tax base by expanding the taxation of their corporations' foreign operations. In the past, residual
residence-hued taxation of business income has captured the tax bue whenever multinational corporations have med tax havens to try to avoid all taxes on
part of their income, • indicated by the proliferation
of subpart F-like regimes around the world. The same
result may happen in this case, as foreign countries vie
to capture the business tax base abandoned unilaterally
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by the U.S. Flom the perspective of the multinational
corporations, a successful attempt by foreign countries
to capture this base would merely eliminate the
windfall resulting from the abolition of the U.S. income
tax; if the U.S. tax base were captured completely, investment patterns would return to their state before
the abolition of the U.S. income tax created an incentive
to shift profits into the United States. This result could
mitigate the distortion in capital flows identified
above, but the only loser in this case would be the U.S.
Treasury, and the gains would accrue to the fiscs of our
trading partners.
Firuuly, as far as individual U.S. taxpayers are concerned, there will be a !'ignificant incentive to consume
abroad. As is familiar to anyone who has seen the ads
touting the low sales tax rate in certain states or
localities (e.g., New Hampshire or Elizabeth, New Jersey), a territorial sales tax provides a powerful incentive to shop out of state, where the rate is lower. Residents of states bordering on Canada or Mexico, as well
as residents of other states with the means to travel
abroad, would find it advantageous to consume in
other countries, especially when the consumption
takes the form of purchasing durables and importing
them back to the U.S. free of VAT. An enforcement
regime would have to be set up in conjunction with the
U.S. customs service to prevent the tax-free impon of
such goods, but the experience of the states with their
compensator~• use tax has shown that this option is far
from ideal, and that actual enforcement is haphazard
at best.
To sum up: The likely effects of abolishing the income tax and replacing it with a sales tax would be to
tum the U.S. into an immense tax haven. Foreign
portfolio investment may flow in, at significant costs
to the ability of other countries to effectively tax their
residents. Both US. and foreign corporations would
likely attempt to shift taxable profits to the U.S., but
this attempt would be counterbalanced by efforts of
foreign countries to capture the business tax base
foregone by the U.S. through increased withholding,
expansion of their tax jurisdiction, and perhaps controls over foreign investment. Unrestricted tax competition and the collapse of the international tax ~ime
tee111 at the moment to be the most likely outcome. It
would thus seem that the advocates of this proposal
would benefit from giving further thought to the implications of their proposal for the world economy and
for our relations with our trading partners.

Armey-Shelby: A Flat Tax on Consumption
The Armey-Shelby/roposal is more complicated
than Archer-Lugar, an its details have not been fully
worked out. Nevertheless, it is possible to extrapolate
the main international implications of the proposal
from the bills filed by Rep. Dick Armey, R-Texas, and
Sen. Richard C. Shelby, R-Ala., and from the description of the flat tax by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushb,
who originated the idea.18
W5ff H.R. 2060; R. Hall .:-,1 A. Rabushb, Tht fhlt Ta
(1995).
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Instead of the current income tax system, Messrs.
Armey and Shelby propose to substitute two flat rate
consumption-based taxes, an individual tax and a business tax. The individual tax, at a rate between 17 and
20 percent, would apply only to earned income
(generally, compensation for personal services, such as
wages earned by an employee), less a relatively high
standard deduction ($21,400 per joint return, plus
$5.000 for each dependent). 11 Dividends, interest, capital gains, and other forms of investment income would
not be taxed. 12
The business tax, at a rate identical to the individual
tax rate, would apply to all businesses (including sole
proprietorships and partnerships as well as corporations) on a cash flow basis, i.e., businesses would be
allowed to deduct all expenses for business inputs
(goods and services) .ind tangible personal and real
property on a current basis.13 In addition, businesses
would be allowed a deduction for compensation.14
Financial income, such as dividends and interest,
would be excluded, and no deduction would be
allowed for interest.15
There are many problems with this proposal in its
current legislative form, which is simply an amendment to a few sections of the code, with no attempt
made to coordinate the amendment with other sections. However, it may be more interesting to explore
the implications of the proposal for international taxation on the assumption that its technical glitches can
be fixed and that it can be brought into a form as
sophisticated as the Nunn-Domenici proposal discussed below. To do that, it is necessary to assume that
the proposal will be amplified along the lines advocated by Hall and Rabushka.1'
According to Hall and Rabushka, the flat tax would
be territorial at both the business and personal levels.17
The business tax would apply to revenue from sales in
the United States, plus the value of exported products;
deductions would be allowed for business inputs in
the United States, as well as the value of imported
inputs.11 If a U.S. firm sends parts to a plant in Mexico
and re-imports the finished product, the value of the
exported parts would be included in income, and the
value of the imported product allowed as a deduction.1' Similarly, the wage tax would apply only to
earnings from work performed in the United States,
whether by U.S. citizens and residents or by nonresidents, but would exempt earnings from work performed abroad (as well as, of course, all unearned income, whether foreign or domestic). 20

11

H.R. 2060, code lldion 63.

IJJl,ill.

H.R. 2060, code MCtion ll(d).
•H.R. 2060, code ledion ll(d)(l)(B).
"H.R. 2060, code ledion ll(c), (d).
165« HaU and Rabuahka. note 10 ,.,....
175« H.R. 2060, code NCtions M(a)(a)(A), ll(c)(2)(A).
"H.R. 2060, code eection lt(d)(l)(A), does not appear lo
lill\il deductions in this manner.
"Hall and Rabushka, note 10 111pr,, at 76.
JIJi.R. 2060, code section 63(a)(l)(A).
11

While the business tax resembles a subtraction
method VAT, it differs from it in one crucial component, namely the deductibility of wages (it may, indeed, be thought of as a subtraction method VAT with
employees being registered VAT taxpayers, so that payments to employees are subject to VAT and deductible
by the payor).21 15ecause of this difference, the flat tax
cannot be made border adjustable under the GATT, i.e.,
it cannot be imposed on imports and rebated on exports. However, most other countries that use a VAT
do not allow a deduction for wages, and make the VAT
border adjustable (as permitted under GATI). The flat
tax proposal is an origin-based tax; most of our trading
partnen have a destination-based VAT. However, this
feature of the flat tax by itself should not be a problem,
as trade economists agree that exempting exports from
taxation and imposing taxes on imports has no effect
on the balance of trade, even if the trading partner
adopts an origin-based tax system.22

Hall •nd R•bu•hk• ~ bllth11 •••rtlon
lh•t no doub/11 tax•tlon would rtl6Uh If
•II Jur/Mllctlon• Mlopttld th• fl•t t•x I•
• cla••lc IIXMllp/11 of'"" prowrbl•I
un o,»llflr.
Hall and Rabushka's blithe assertion that no double
taxation would result if all jurisdictions adopted the
flat tax is a classic example of the proverbial can
opener." Since not all countries have a flat tax or a
territorial system, what would be the result? Let's assume a country that has a worldwide income tax system with a foreign tax credit. Under our current tax
treaties, the flat tax would not be creditable; nor would
our treaty partners have much incentive to negotiate
new treaties to make it creditable, because of the flat
tax's low rate and the abolition of taxation on investment income of nonresidents, whose reduction is typically the main bargaining chip for new tax treaties.2•
Thus, to the extent that foreign c-orporations engage in
business in the United States, they would frequently
be subject to both the flat tax and their home country
tax. This, however, should not be a major problem,
because importen are unlikely to have much flat tax
liability because of the deduction for imported goods,
and the lack of transfer pricing enforcement. Indeed,
Steve Shay has suggested that the business tax liability
for importen can be eliminated by tax-haven re-invoicing operations •and other anachronisms of international tax planning. • 25
A more serious double tax issue faces foreignen who
earn employment income in the United States. Foreign
individual investon would be exempt from U.S. tax,

1

111

this oblervation lo Oliver Oldman.
note 9 ,.,,,,., 479; Shay, note 2
supra, al 1.2.3.4.
19Hall and Rabushb, note 10 s11pr,, at 76.
14See the discUMion of treaties below.
~y. note 2 s11,w•. at 3.3.
111 owe

5« Zodrow and Mclure,

11
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creating the same tax haven incentives discussed
above. However, foreigners who e.am employment income in the U.S. and come from a jurisdiction that
imposes tax on worldwide income are likely lo face
double taxation in the absence of treaty relief. Our
current tax treaties probably do not apply to the flat
tax, since it is not an income tax; and it is unclear
whether foreign jurisdictions would have enough incentive to negotiate new treaties with the U.S. just to
grant relief to individuals employed here, in the absence of withholding taxes on investment income.
For outbound investment and employment, the flat
tax, like any territorial system, creates pressure to
source income out of the United States. Indeed, the
current legislative version of the Armey-Shelby proposal contains no safeguards against keeping all
deductions in the U.S. and all income in tax havens
abroad (for example, there is no subpart F).2' In the
case of individual taxpayers, the incentive is to perform
services outside the U.S., which will not be subject to
the wage tax (which applies only to domestic employment). While in most situations other countries may
lax that income, in the case of individuals who perform
highly mobile services (such as lawyers or consultants)
there would be a significant bonus in performing their
services by phone from the Cayman Islands or Barbados, where no local tax is imposed.
For the business tax, there would be a significant
incentive to inflate the (deductible) value of imports
and reduce the (indudable) value of exports. In particular, the flat tax makes no attempt to address the
most significant sourcing problem under the current
income tax, i.e., the treatment of transfer pricing among
related entities. In the U.S.-Mexico round trip transaction outlined above, if the Mexican entity is controlled
by the U.S. exporter/re-importer, there would be a
strong incentive to value the goods as low as possible
on their way out, and to buy them for as much as
possible on their way back in as finished products, with
the profit remaining in Mexico (where it may or may
not be taxed, depending on the vicissitudes of the Maquiladora regime). There is no section 482 in H.R. 2060
to combat this problem. Thus, it is not enough to say,
as Hall and Rabushka do, that it would be euy to value
imports based on "the actual amount paid for them in
the country of their origin";2' if that amount is paid to
a related entity, it may bear little relation to actual
value, but it would be quite hard to prove this, as the
IRS has found out under the current code. While this
problem exists under current law, it would be exacerbated under a territorial system that never taxes
foreign profits.
In addition, as pointed out by Mclure and 7.odrow,
the fact that interest expeme is not deductible and
interest income is excluded under the flat tax creates a
significant incentive to shift interest expeme to other
forms of deductible expenNS, and to shift other forms
of income to interest income, when the other party to

JISl\ay, note 2 ,.,,,,., at 3.2.
27 Hall ilnd Rabushka, note 10 supra, at 76.
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the transaction is indifferent because it is subject to a
traditional income tax. 21 This incentive would further
reduce receipts from the business portion of the flat
tax. For example, assume a U.S. firm (USCo) that sells
its products to a foreign firm (ForCo) and simultaneously either lends money to ForCo or borrows
money from Fo.Co. In the first case (i.e., a loan to
Fo.Co), USCo has an incentive to reduce the price of
its products (thus reducing taxable receipts) while raising the interest r.ate on the loan (thus earning exempt
income); ForCo is indifferent, since both expenses are
deductible. In the second case (a loan from Fo.Co),
Fo.Co would be willing to obtain a lower interest rate
on its loan to USCo, compensated by the lower sales
price of the products; USCo benefits from lower taxable
receipts, while the interest expense is not deductible.
The same analysis applies, with the roles reversed,
when USCo buys products from Fo.Co; in this case,
USCo will seek to increase the deductible inputs while
decreasing the nondeductible interest expense or increasing the exdudible interest income.
For inbound investment into the U.S., the U.S. income tax base is abandoned as much as in the ArcherLugar proposal. There is no tax on foreign portfolio
investment, resulting in the same incentive to divert
funds into the U.S. as discussed above, with the attendant international complications. For business entities,
the low rate, plus the absence of transfer pricing enforcement, will likely result in the same unilateral
abandonment of the U.S. tax jurisdiction and the attempt by other countries to capture the tax base, as
discussed above. Thus, despite its greater complexity,
the Armey-Shelby proposal seems likely to result in
approximately the same outcome as the Archer-Lugar
one: It would likely tum the U.S. into a tax haven and
set off unrestrained tax competition.

Thu•, H6/llttl It• grHtt1r compl11xlty,
,,_ A,,,,.y•SMlby prop06•1
1/aly to tum 11111 U.S. Into • tax h•wn
Mid.., oll un,..tr•lntHI t•x

••m•

t:0m,-t1tlon.
In sum, the flat tax proposal suffers from several
major dnwbacks. For inbound portfolio investment, it
would create a tax haven for passive investon, while
penalizing individuals who work in the United States
by sub;ecting them to double taxation. For inbound
direct investment, the ability to manipulate the value
of imports and to shift interest expense to imports
would likely mean that little tax would be collected
from businesses importing into the United States. The
same problem would bedevil efforts to collect tax on
outbound exports, where taxable receipts could again
be llllnimiz.led by increasing interest income and deductible imports. Finally, there would be a signifacant
incentive to perform services outside the United States.

IIMcLure and Zodrow, note 2 s11pra. at 15.

117

COIIIIENTARY/SPECIALREPORT
Some of these problems can perhaps be fixed with
appropriate technical modifications. For example, the
interest income and expense issue can be solved by
including in income all borrowings (principal and interest) and allowing a deduction for all repayments
(principal and interest), i.e., moving to a cash flow tax,
which in present value terms is equivalent to the current proposal of excluding interest income and disallowing interest deductions. 29 However, that would
reinstate one of the most vexing problems in current
law, namely how to distinguish between interest expense (deductible) and dividends (nondeductible in
both systems). Similarly, the transfer pricing issue can
perhaps be solved by extensive auditing and coordination with customs valuations, where the incentive is to
reduce value, although the experience with these
methods under the income tax has been far from
promising. But these changes would mean that the
resulting system would in practice be far from the
simple, tax-return-on-a-postcard ideal envisaged by
the sponsors of the flat tax. Moreover, some of the basic
distortions (the tax haven effect, the incentive to work
abroad) would remain, as they are the result of fundamental principles (exempting investment income,
and territoriality). It will be interesting to see how the
proponents of the flat tax proposal, which is still far
from fully developed as a legislative matter, adjust it
to respond to concerns such as these in the months
ahead.
Nunn-Domenid: A ProgreHive Consumption Tax

The Nunn-Domenici proposal is by far the most
thoroughly elaborated and carefully thought out of the
three proposals currently on the table. Not only has an
extensive description and explanation of their -unlimited Savings Allowance Income Tax System" been
published, but an elaborate bill with specific legislation
to replace most of the Internal Revenue Code has been
introduced in the Senate as S. 122. The following discussion is based on these two sources, and where they
diverge, the differences will be identified. As will be
seen, the Nunn-Domenici proposal does avoid some of
the specific pitfalls that face the two proposals discussed above, but it raises some additional concerns
about its international implications. Moreover, even
Nunn-Domenici, with all its complexity, does not avoid
the major concerns identified in the discussion of the
simple Archer-Lugar proposal.
The essence of the Nunn-Domenici proposal is as
follows. Business is subjf'ct to a Oat 11 percent tax rate,
which applies to all forms of business (whether or not
incorporated), with an immediate deduction for capital
investments.• Financial receipts and payments (such
as interest and dividends) are excluded from income
and are not deductible, nor (unlike the Oat tax proposal) is compensation deductible. 31 The business tax
is territorial; businesses are not subject to tax on

8Mctu.. and Zodrow, note 2 ..,,., at 17.
-S. 722, code NClion 201.
115,. 722, code Mdions 202. 203.
111

receipts from sales made or services provided outside
the United States.32 It is also border adjustable; receipts
from export sales are excluded, while imports are subject to an import tax at the same rate as the business
tax (or, in the case of imported services, are not deductible)."
Individuals are subject to tax at graduated rates
(from 8 to 40 percent, according to the legislative proposal) on their worldwide income, just like under the
current income tax.,. However, individuals can deduct
all net savings (including bank accounts and other
forms of savings) at the end of the year, and must
include in income all dissaving (reduction in net
sav .ngs accumulated in previous years).35 Individuals
who also own a business must file two separate
returns, one for themselves and one for the business.

I

Th11 Nunn-Domt111/cl propoul I• by far
1h11 mo« thorou11hly 11/aborat«I and
t:al'tlfully thou11ht out of t1- lhrH
propoul• cu""ntly on tM table.

The business tax is in all material respects
equivalent to a subtraction method VAT: all inputs
other than compensation are deductible (if made to
business taxpayers, i.e., registered VAT taxpayers) or
subject to tax (if made to persons not subject to the tax,
such as foreigners in the case of imports).• All receipts
from sales of goods or services (but not financial
receipts) are includable.37 These characteristics mean
that the tax can probably be made border adjustable
under the GAIT, i.e., it is a destination-based VAT, like
those imposed by our trading partners. It also means
that the burden of the tax will be shifted forward to
consumers in the form of higher prices; indeed, it is
this shift that makes the tax border adjustable under
the GAIT.• Thus, it is less than completely honest to
claim, as the legislation does, that -corporations and
other businesses pay about the same portion of the total
tax as under the current Code...,. The question, of
coune, is not who pays the tax, but who bears the
burden of the tax; and the effect of Nunn-Domenici is
to abolish the corporate inrome tax and shift the entire
burden to domestic consumers, who will also pay the
individual tax (which is levied only on consumption,

IIS. 722. code section 203(a).
US. 722, code l«tions 265, 266, 267, 286.

MS. 722, code l«lions 1, 15.
-S. 722. code l4!dion 50; on these definitions, see Warren.
note 1111,,..
-S. 722, code l«tion 205.
1175. 722, code Ndion 203.
•11 is likely, but not certain, that the exclusion of export
receipts in the USA tax would survive a GATI challenge
because of the similarity to a destination-based VAT, although the attempt to label the USA tax as a business tax and
not a VAT is unlikely to be helpful. S. Shay, note 2 s11pr•. at
J.2.3.2; E. Toder, "Comments on Proposals for Fundamental
Tax Reform," Ju Nola, Mar. 27, 1995, p. 2003.
-S. 722, section J01(b)(8)(A).
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not on savings). The difference from the current situa·
tion depends on the incidence of the corporate income
tax; but if that tax is borne at least in part by shareholders and not entirely by consumers, the distributive
effects of Nunn-Domenici are likely to differ significantly from those of current law.
Nevertheless, precisely this feature of the tax resolves some of the specific international issues identified above. As a destination-baled VAT, the business
tax is perfectly compatible with the tax systems of our
major trading partners; and since it will be shifted
forward to consumers, the double taxation problem
identified above (in the case of the flat tax) does not
arise. For example, assume that a U.S. corporation imports wine from France at $10 per bottle and resells it
in the U.S. for $12. If the business tax is treated as
equivalent to the French income tax, there would be
complete double taxation, since the French exporter
would pay income tax to France, while the U.S. im·
porter would have to pay the import tax on the $10
price of the bottle (even though the same $10 had already been taxed in France), and again pay the business
tax on its $2 net receipts. Since paying tax on the value
of an imported input is equivalent to denying a deduction for the input (and deductions are indeed disallowed for imported services under the USA tax
regime), the U.S. co-poration would be paying the tax
on its gross receipts of $12 per bottle. However, once
the business tax is seen for what it is, i.e., equivalent
to the French VAT, it becomes clear that the cost will
be shifted forward to the consumer, and that it is approrriate to tax the import since the French exporter
wil pay no VAT on exports.tO
Malting the business tax destination-based also resolves the transfer pricing problem identified above.
As the sponsors of the proposal state, it would not be
advantageous to inflate the price of deductible inputs
from related parties, because that would result in a
higher import tax being levied on the same inputs.41
However, as discussed below, transfer pricing will still
be significant from the perspective of our trading
partners, and this could lead to unfavorable repercussions for U.S. businesses.
In addition, this feature of the business tax solves
Mclure and Zodrow's interest problem: In the case of
a U.S. importer, there would be no advantage to increase the price of (deductible) imported goods in exchange for a lower interest rate on borrowed funds or
a higher rate on funds lent to the 11eUer, because the
imports would be subject to import tax; while exports
are not a problem since the system ignores both
receipts from exports and interest income and expense.
However, the abolition of the corporate income tax
does have some unfortunate consequences from the
point of view of our trading partners. As pointed out

•As Shay points out, if lhe import tax is not trullld • a
VAT, it would mo violate cumnt inlemational norms becaute
it would tax inbound sales in the abtence of a permanent
eshlblilhment. Shay, note 2 -,,., at 1.2.5.2; 2.6.5.

••Description, note 5 ..,,,., at 1~97.
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above, there would under this proposal as well be an
obvious incentive for both U.S. multinationals doing
business abroad and foreign multinationals engaged in
business in the U.S. to shift as much of their profit as
possible to the U.S., where it would not be sub;ect to
tax. This can be done either through deductible payments by foreign mated entities, or by transfer pricing
manipulation. The N!Sult would be to put a lot of pressure on other countries either to adopt the NunnDomenid proposal and abolish the corporate income
tax, even though they may not wish to do so as a tax
policy matter, or to heighten their enforcement of thin
capitalization rules and transfer pricing in ways that
wiU penalize U.S. business abroad, such as the imposition of discriminatory formulas requiring a minimum
profit level and flat denial of interest deductions.

Nunn-00,,,.n/cl wlll lllt11/y CINftl •

•gnHlc•nt lnt:flflt/N for foMlgn

corpon,llon• to •x,,.nd Into 1h11 U.S. to
.,,.II#
th-,, to NMIII from It• n•w

•t•tu• •• •

corporat11

t•x h•v11n.

In addition, similarly to the Archer-Lugar proposal
discussed above, Nunn-Domenici will likely create a
significant incentive for foreign corporations to expand
into the U.S. to enable them to benefit from its new
status as a corporate tax haven. As discussed above,
foreign countries are likely to respond by amending
their source rules so as to include income that is currently sourced in the U.S. in their tax base; or by taxing
their corporations on a worldwide basis, so as to capture the entire revenue base foregone by the U.S. The
end result is likely to be a net transfer of considerable
revenue from the U.S. Treasury to foreign f111CS, with
little benefit to foreign taxpayers. The unilateral abolition of the US. corporate income tax will mean that
this type of issue is unlikely to be resolved by treaty,
because (in the absence of an income tax, or effective
withholding taxes) the U.S. will have no bargaining
leverage left.
TIie territorial nature of the business tax creates an
inc:entive to shift sales abroad. For example, if a corporation has a choice whether to provide- services to a
customer abroad or in the U.S., or to seU goods directly
to the customer abroad or to its U.S. branch, there is
an incentive to sell the goods or services abroad to
avoid taxable receipts. From the point of view of the
customer, the cost of goods sold or services provided
is likely to be deductible (for income tax purposes) and
nondeductible (for VAT purposes) no matter what the
geographic location of the transfer.42

GS. 722 does not contain dear rules about the allocation of
deductions, 10 that domestic apenditwa that benefit foreign
business activity (e.g., UrD) can be absorbed directly against
U.S. receipts. The likely effect, even when the similar t.ck of
allocation for foreign expenditures is taken into account, ii a

sizable reduction in US. receipts. Shay, note 2 111,m,. at 2.4.3.
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In the cue of services performed both abroad and
in the U.S., as pointed out in the USA Tax Description,
the transfer pricing problem will persist.0 The foreign
provider of the services will have an incentive to provide them abroad, while the U.S. recipient will have an
incentive to have them provided in the U.S., but only
if it can use a deduction. If the U.S. party cannot use
deductions, the IRS will have to audit the transaction
and reallocate the income to the U.S. However, if no
services are provided in the U.S. at all, the IRS will
have no basis for reallocation. It seems unlikely that
this problem would be as rare as the sponsors of the
Nunn-Domenid proposal seem to believe.tt
The individual tax is subject to a different set of
concerns. For U.S. citizens and residents, the tax is
imposed on worldwide income, avoiding the problem
of shifting income abroad that is found in the business
tax and in the Oat tax.•5 Worldwide savings are likewise
deductible, so that (as in the flat tax, where worldwide
interest, dividends, and capital gains are excludable)
there is no distortionary effect on the location of
savings, except as far as foreign taxes are concerned
(on which see below).46 The proposal preserves the
foreign earned income exclusion under section 911
(currently, up to $70,000)." According to the Description, the foreign tax credit is abolished (but a deduction
is allowed for foreign taxes imposed on wages earned
abroad), but under the legislative proposal (which was
filed later), the foreign tax credit is preserved.• We will
discuss each proposal in tum.
The effects of the system set out in the Description
(i.e., abolishing the foreign tax credit), in terms of the
traditional consumption tax analysis, are interesting. A
deduction of savings is equal to the exemption for the
income generated from those savings, but only when
the rates are equal. If the investment abroad is deductible against U.S. tax liability, but the income from the
investment is subject not only to U.S. tax but also to
foreign tax (with no credit, nor even a deduction), the
result is a real tax burden on the investment (because
it is subject to a higher tax rate than the deduction),
and a heavy penalty against investing abroad. This
would create extreme pressure on other countries to
reduce their taxes on capital inflows, which in the case
of developing countries could have significant adverse

. ,..,_

"Dncription, note 5 111pr•, at 1541 .

-S. 722, code section 3(a).
-S. 722, code ledion 53. As Shay points out, this provision
means that the actual effed of the USA tax propoul on
domestic Nvinp depend• on the attractiveneN of foaeign
Nvings options, and on the ability to attract foreign portfolio
investment. Shay, note 2 ..,,,., at 2.2.3; Mclure and Zodrow,
note 9 ,.,,,., at 451-52.
t15. 722, code section 4(a)(8); the value of the exdusion is
inae11ed, however, became of the steep rate schedule of the
proposal (income above $24,000 on a joint retum is taxed at
the top 40 percent rate). Shay, note 2 ,.,,,,., at 2.2.4.
-onmp1ion, note 5 ..,,,., at 1524; S. 722. code section
20(a)(l).
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revenue consequences. It would also distort U.S. capital flows toward the domestic investment.
As far as wage income is concerned, there would
also be a disincentive to work abroad because foreign
taxes would only be deductible, not creditable, so that
the effective tax rate abroad is likely to be higher. This
effect is, however, mitigated by the section 911 exclusion, as well as the potential deduction if the income
earned abroad is saved ...
S. 122, on the other hand, retains the foreign tax
credit for the individual tax, virtually unchanged: The
main difference is that the credit is to be governed by
"rules prescribed by the Secretary," instead of the current elaborate code provisions, and that it applies only
to foreign taxes on amounts includable in gross income
(but that amount is virtually unchanged from current
law).50 The result is that no significant simplification is
achieved in this area. Presumably, ·the Secretary would
have to re-introduce most of the complexity of the current rules, such as the basket system, to prevent taxpayers from avoiding paying tax on foreign-source income. The price of economic neutrality, as is often the
case, is increased complexity, which is hidden by shifting the burden of rulemaking to the Treasury.
The legislative version of the Nunn-Domenici proposal also takes a different view on the taxation of
nonresident aliens deriving income from sources
within the United States. The USA Tax Description
does not address the latter, except by implication, because it envisages repeal of the source rules contained
in sections 861-865.51 Since taxing nonresidents on passive ("flXed or determinable, annual, or periodic") income from the U.S. depends on the source rules, the
Description seems t-, envisage abolishing these withholding taxes. This is consistent with the de facto
repeal of the effective taxation of dividends, interest,
and other forms of the return on savings, granted by
virtue of the deductibility of net savings in the first
place.
S. 122, however, retains the withholding system of
current law. A 30 percent tax is levied on amounts
received by nonresident alien individuals "from sources
within the United States" as FDAP.52 This, of course,
means that the source rules have to be retained. The
portfolio interest exemption is likewise retained. There
is even an attempt to tax nonresident aliens who
receive dividends, interest, or wages from business
operations conducted in the U.S., although the U.S. has
never succeeded in collecting such "second order" t.: "
on distributions from foreign corporations to their
shareholders, creditors, or employees." (The legislation does not retain the branch profit tax, which is an
effective, but complicated, solution to this problem.)

91'.>eductible net savinp are not reduced by foreign income
shehered by the IKtion 911 exclusion. Cf. S. 722, code section
52(a)(2)(B) (excluding Nvinp from the interest on tax-exempt
bonds}.
"S. 722, code section 20(a)(l).
SIDescrtption, note 5 s,,pra, at 1540.
722, code section 131.
US. 722, code section 131(1,)(4).
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There is also an attempt to retain the tax on expatriates
in current section 877, although the Treasury has admitted that this tax is almost never enforceable.!M
The purpose of retaining the withholding tax is
clear: To induce other countries to enter into treaties
with the United States, and to prevent the unilateral
creation of a tax haven, as discussed above. Indeed, the
withholding taxes are abolished for residents of any
foreign country that does not levy similar taxes on U.S.
residents, and has a tax information sharing agreement
with the United States.• We shall discuss the question
of treaties further below, but there is a problem with
the withholding tax as proposed: Since foreigners get
no deduction for their U.S. savings (they have no net
U.S. tax liability, and savings are not deductible against
the gross withholding tax), U.S. residents would end
up having a much lower tax burden on investments in
the U.S. than foreigners (except to the extent the
portfolio interest exemption applies). This situation, in
addition to being discriminatory and arguably violating the very treaties it is designed to salvage, also could
drive a wedge against foreign investment in the U.S.;
why should a U.S. corporation be willing to reimburse
a foreign investor against withholding taxes imposed
on dividends or interest, when there is no need to
similarly reimburse a U.S. investor who pays no effective tax?

•t1t1m•

h
•t,.,,,,. for• t•x th•t I•
lnt•ndtld to •PPIY to con•umptlon, but
not urlng•, to o,-,.t• pr«:l••ly tM
oppo6lt• -Y wh•n It t:omt1• to
nonM•ldtln,..
Moreover, it seems strange for a tax that is intended
to apply to consumption, but not savings, to operate
precisely the opposite way when it comes to nonresidents: While a French citiz.en visiting the United States
may consume as much as she desires without being
subject to the Nunn-Domenici tax, the same person
would be subject to tax when she invests her savings
in the shares of a United States corporation. It would
seem more consistent with the purposes of the NunnDomenici proposal to refrain from taxing such investments from abroad.
However, as Steve Shay points out, the effect of the
withholding provisions of S. 722 will probably be nil,
and the above problems will disappear, unless the
legislative language is changed. That result obtains
becaute the withholding rules u dnfted apply only to
individuals, and not to offshore investment companies." Dividends and interest paid to such entities
would also not be subject to the business tax, because
a financial intermediation business conducted entirely

MS. 722, code aection 13l(c); . . lhe lfttimony of Auistant
Secretary Leslie B. Samuels on lhe propoeed changes to NCtion

outside the U.S. is not subject to the tax. 57 If these
provisions are unchanged, the U.S. has effectively
"given away the store," and inbound portfolio invest•
ment will be completely untaxed.
To sum up: The N unn-Domenici proposal, while better than its competitors, has some significant defects
as regards international transactions. For direct investment, it imposes a destination-based VAT, avoiding
double taxation as well as some of the technical
problems identified in the discussion of the flat tax
(such as the incentive to shift interest expense to cost
of goods sold). However, it still creates powerful incentives for U.S. businesses to shift from domestic to
export sales. For foreign businesses, the incentive is to
shift taxable profits into the new corporate tax haven
in the U.S., which is likely to lead foreign jurisdictions
to try to capture the entire corporate tax base foregone
by the U.S. by changing their source rules or imposing
worldwide taxation on their corporate residents.
For individual U.S. taxpayers, the proposal contained in the USA Tax Description would lead to discrimination against foreign investments (because of the
abolition of the foreign tax credit), and a disincentive
to eam wage income abroad (there would, however, be
no discrimination between foreign and domestic consumption). The legislative proposal solves this problem by reinstating the foreign tax credit for individuals,
but makes no attempt to simplify its rules. For foreign
individuals, wages earned in the U.S. would be subject
to tax (and possibly, in the absence of a tax treaty,
taxable twice), but passive income would be taxable
under the legislation only by withholding. Such with·
holding, if implemented, would create a significantly
higher level of tax on foreigners investing in the U.S.
than on domestic investment, and would form a wedge
against such investment from abroad, while doing
nothing to inhibit foreignen from consuming here. On
the other hand, withholding can be easily avoided
under the legislative venion of the USA proposal, and
in the absence of withholding, the U.S. would become
even more of a tax haven, and any remaining incentive
to retain our tax treaties would be lost.

The Impact on Tax Treaties
The income tax treaty network is one of the most
significant achievements of 20th century international
law. Through more than 1,200 bilateral treaties conforming in general to the OECD or UN models, most
countries have agreed to follow a broad consensus
about the proper allocation of taxable income among
taxing jurisdictions. In very broad terms, this consensus can be summarized u follows: Active business
income is taxable by the jurisdiction in which it is
earned (the source jurisdiction) if the activities of the
taxpayer in that jurisdiction are significant enough to
rise to the level of a •permanent establishment.• Pusive income, on the other hand, is taxable primarily in
the jurisdiction in which the taxpayer resides (the

m, ,s tHr 56-40.

"S. 722, code NCtion 133(c).
"S. 722, code NCtion 131; Shay, note 2 supra, at 2.3.3.
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residence jurisdiction), with only a relatively low withholding tax being payable to the soun:e country."
While this consensus has several unsolved problems
(primarily regarding the allocation of active business
income to its sourc:es, the enforcement of residencebased taxation of passive income, and the treatment of
integrated tax systems), it has overall proven extremely
resilient and has been maintained over 50 years of immense ~onomic and technological changes. However,
the survival of the consensus should a major player in
t~ ~orld economy unilaterally abandon income taxation as far from assured, and the likely replacement if
the consensus collapses is far from promising.
The simplest case to consider in this regard is again
the Archer-Lugar proposal to completely abolish the
income tax and replace it with a sales tax. Obviously,
this reform would render all existing U.S. income tax
tre~ties obsolete. There wo_uld ~ a highly significant
enticement for both portfolio capital and direct investment to flow into the U.S., and there would be no
reason other than competition for capital for countries
not to tax inbound U.S. investment. In this situation,
there are two likely outcomes. Those countries that
have a large domestic market and can count, at least,
on a continuation of U.S. direct investment are likely
to move to prevent the erosion of their tax base that
will result if U.S. corporations are allowed to shift taxable profits to the U.S., and if their own corporations
can expand their U.S. operations. This will involve new
thin capitalization rules and transfer pricing enforcement. As stated above, such countries may also try to
capture some of the tax base given up by the U.S., in
the case of U.S. investors, by amending their soun:e
rules (to source more income domestically), or by disregarding whether investment rises to the level of a
permanent establishment before it is taxed, and to levy
taxes on the global income of their own corporations
(to capture any income earned in the U.S.).
The abandonment of U.S. withholding taxes would
put a lot of pressure on even the largest jurisdictions
to abandon any residual taxation under tax treaties of
portfolio investment. The likely outcome would be the
end of source-based taxation of passive investment income. While large countries may be able to tolerate
this, the impact on small, developing countries could
be disastrous, since withholding at source is those
countries' only feasible way of levying taxes on inbound investment. In addition, developing countries
would be hard put to stem the flight of capital to the
new, immeNe tax haven in the United States.
Thus, there are two likely outcomes from the
unilateral abolition of income taxation by the U.S.:
Fint, an increase in the tax burden levied abroad on
U.S. direct investment, and on foreign investment in
the US., to the extent countries can afford to do so
without halting investment. That extent is likely to be
measured by the amount saved by taxpayers' ceasing
to owe income taxes to the U.S.; instead, they would
pay the same income taxes to the foreign government,

•5« g,ner•lly Avi-Yonah, note 8 .,,,,,..
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and remain relatively neutral in the process. The
gainers would be the governments of our large trading
partners, and the loser would be the U.S. Treasury.
Second, a "race to the bottom" on taxation of portfolio
capital, which could devastate the revenue raising
potential of the developing world, while attracting
huge amounts of "hot money" into the United States.
Unrestrained tax competition, with all its adverse effects on countries' ability to pursue policies of their
choice, seems the most likely outcome."
The situation would not be much different under the
other two regimes considered above. First, as a purely
legal matter, neither the flat tax nor the NunnDomenici tax regime likely qualify as "income taxes"
under the U.S. definition of the term, because they both
deny a deduction for interest expense. (Nor would the
situation change if loans were included in income and
principal and interest were deductible, because the inclusion of loans would violate the realization requirement that defines an income tax under U.S. rules.)'°
Thus, in both cases, the United States has no right to
expect that other countries would maintain their income tax treaties with it after tax reform is enacted,
unless it is in their interest to do so, because the tax
that the U.S. would levy is not an income tax. Fun~~mentally, inc°".'e t!x conventions apply to taxes on
income and capital ; taxes on consumption are not
covered.
Under the flat tax regime, the U.S. tax system is
com..,let~ly territorial, has very low effective corporate
and md1v1dual tax rates, and does not tax passive income (i.e., there is no withholding). As far as direct
investment is concerned, the effect is similar to abolishing the corporate income tax, because both U.S. and
foreign corporations would prefer to be taxed at 17 to
20 percent, with full expensing of capital expenditures,
rather than be subject to the corporate tax rates of our
trading partners. Thus, large foreign countries would
have the same incentive to capture the residual income
foregone by the U.S. For portfolio investment, the
result under the flat tax is identical to the abolition of
the income tax, because there is no taxation of passive
income flowing out of the United States. Thus, in practice, foreign countries that have the ability to attract
American business would have no incentive to renegotiate tax treaties with the US. to cover the flat tax
(especially since there is no taxation of U.S. investment
abroad); instead, as outlined under the sales tax
scenario, they would expand their tax base of direct
investment, while a race to the bottom would develop
for portfolio investment.
Finally, the Nunn-Domenici proposal, especially in
its legislative form, makes an effort to save the income
tax treaty system, but that effort seems unlikely to succeed. Fint, as regards direct investment, the effect of
Nunn-Domenici is the abolition of the corporate in-

"On the advene effects of tax competition, see R. Green,
"The Futu~ of Soutte-Bued Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises,• 79 Conttll L Rev. 18, 55-63 (1993).
•5« current section 901 and reg. s«tion 1.901-2(b)(4).
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come tax and its replac:ement by a destination-based
VAT. Thus, there would be no reason for our treaty
partnen to maintain their treaties with the U.S. for
corporate income taxation, because the U.S. will not
have a corporate tax bue. Second, for portfolio invest·
ment, the Nunn-Domenid proposal maintains worldwide taxation of U.S. residents and (nominally) with·
holding taxes on nonresidents. However, residents are
effectively exempt from U.S. taxation of their domestic
investments because of the deduction for net savings,
and therefore would not invest abroad unless the effective tax rate on their investment at source is zero.
In this situati~ foreign govemments are unlikely to
want to maintain a treaty network with the U.S., because they would have to reduc:e their withholding at
source to zero to attract U.S. investon even in the absenc:e of a treaty, and if they do so, the U.S. withholding
tax would likewise disappear (or else the U.S. could
not attract foreign capital). Moreover, in its currently
proposed form, foreignen can easily avoid the withholding tax, so its reduction would not be an effective
bargaining chip. The end result is therefore likely to be
similar to that described for the other two cases: An
expansion of foreign taxation of direct investment to
capture the tax base abandoned by the U.S., and the
abolition of all taxation at source for portfolio investment. The fint result would have negative consequences for the U.S. Treasury with no benefit to U.S.
business, while the second would hurt primarily third
world economies with unclear benefits to the United
States.

Conclusion
Is it possible, in an increasingly integrated world

economy, for the United States to adopt radical tax
reform without having a significant adverse impact on
the rest of the world, and indirectly, on the United
States itself? The purpose of this article has been to
suggest that the answer to this question is •no,• and
that the international implications of radical tax reform
should be considered u one of the important deter·
1ninants in the decision whether to punue this course.
This conclusion does not imply that the U.S. should
never reform its tax system, or even that radical reform
is too dangerous to be pursued. When the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 lowered the U.S. tax rate and broadened
the bue, the result was the adoption of similar reforms
in most other industrialized countries, with generally
positive results. The reforms currently under discussion are, however, far more profound than the 1986 act,
and would probably have more disturbing conse-

quences.
Ideally, the proponents of the reform proposals
would like the rest of the world to follow suit and
abolish income taxation, replacing it with mme form
of consumption-baled taxes. However, the other mesnbers of the OECD, as well as most developing
countries, already rely heavily on consumption-based
taxes (specifically, the VAT), and it seems unlikely that
they could raise the necessary revenue foregone as a
result of abandoning income taxation by further raising
the already high rates of unpopular consumption-

based taxes. Thus, other countries may face the un•
pleasant choic:e of either significantly reducing their
tax revenues and cutting government programs they
deem important, or trying (by the means outlined
above) to preserve the income tax by entering into
unrestricted tax competition with the United States.

Tl» lntwn•tlo,,./ lmpllt:llflon• of
twdlt:al tax ,.form •hould 1M
t:OtMltlwwl •• OM of th• lmport•nt
_,.,,,,,,,.nt• In IM 1#1:l•lon wh«hM
to punw thl• cou,...
Fundamentally, the question to be faced in this
country has to be whether the benefits that are foreseen
as flowing from radical lax reform, primarily an in•
crease in the national savings rate and simplification,
outweigh the likely negative impact on o ar relations
with the rest of the world, including the possible collapse of the income tax treaty system and its replacement with a "rac:e to the bottom.• This question is
particularly acute because it would appear that both a
shift to a more consumption-based tax system, and
considerable simplification, can be achieved without
completely abandoning the income tax. 61
About 200 years ago, Edmund Burke suggested that
it is not an advisable method of reform to start every•
thing from scratch: "You had all these advantages in
your ancient states; but you chose to act as if you had
never been moulded into dvil sodety, and had every
thing to begin anew. You began ill, because you began
by despising every thing that belonged to you."62 Instead, he suggested gradual reform, as a way of
preserving what is useful without unduly hindering
change: •Thus, by preserving the method of nature in
the conduct of the state, in what we improve we are
never wholly new; in what we retain we are never
wholly obsolete...., Perhaps today's conservative adherents of radical tax reform should take to heart those
prettpts of the father of modem conservatism.

11.As ha frequently ~ ~inted out, the current U.S. "income tax• segime is • hybrid between a Hai,-Simons income
tu and • COIIIUlllption tax. The adoption o an explicit eonawnption-1,Med tax in the U.S., 111Ch • a VAT, in addition to
the inmme tax, would make poNiWe cansidenble lilnplifacalion of the income tu system by abandoning ICfflle of ill
hybrid characteriltics (e.g., moving further towards abolishing the INlization 111quuement). For a propoea1 to achieve
dr•tk limpllfkalion of one particularly complex area of current law in the context of ietaining the income tax, tee AviYonah. note 8 sup,•.
.,E. Burke. Rql«tions on tlw RnolNtion in Fr•nct (1790; repr.

1984), 122.
6111,id., at 120.

m

